There have to date been two separate inquiries into the
wherefores of Britain's participation in the Iraq war - those
of Lords Hutton and Butler in 2004.
Each of these supplied voluminous material for public
consumption but, while masquerading according to public
expectation as quasi "trials", their remits were simply to
ascertain the facts.
It was not to apportion blame, although, when the conclusion
was reached that this hugely unpopular war was largely an
accident of history, and that no single individual or group
of individuals was at fault, there were howls of outrage and
cries of "whitewash".
It is in response to the unsatisfactory aftermath of the
former that the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq war was
conceived, and set in motion last week.
Whether any more definitive conclusions, particularly with
respect to culpability, will emerge from this inquiry must be
open to doubt, a fact noted by commentators on what has
become "the biggest show in town" even before it is a week
old.
The Chilcot Inquiry, wrote Guardian columnist Simon Jenkins,
"can no more deliver accountability than could its
predecessors".
The questions the inquiry might seek to answer, however, are
what assurances did former British prime minister Tony Blair
give to former president George W.
Bush on Britain's participation or otherwise in the war, and
when; was "regime change" considered legal and was Mr Blair
advised over this; did the intelligence agencies allow their
information to be misconstrued as the case for war was made;
and what significant plans, if any, were made for Iraq
post-invasion?
In the first few days, while there was much talk of
"ground-breaking" revelations, most of these simply confirm
information already in the public domain.
As Mr Jenkins has robustly remarked in print, the report
could be written in one sentence: "Tony Blair went to war in
Iraq because he lacked the guts to stand up to George Bush,
say the invasion was not justified by facts or law, and
refuse to join him in Baghdad."
And a number of senior legal figures have queried Sir John's
ambition that the inquiry would seek to establish the
legality or otherwise of the war, and Britain's participation
in it, primarily because the panel of six hearing the
evidence and testimony has not one legal expert or senior
lawyer among them.
Notwithstanding that many matters have been established
either through leaked reports, published memoirs or loose
tongues, the fact that Mr Blair's government, or at least Mr
Blair himself, had decided up to a year before the invasion
that it was a "complete waste of time" to resist the US drive
for regime change in Iraq, arrives with a certain frisson.
This was part of the picture given by Sir Christopher Meyer,
British ambassador to Washington from 1997-2003, to the
inquiry.
He also confirmed that the eventual invasion in March 2003
was dictated by the "unforgiving nature" of the US military
build-up, rather than by the failure of diplomacy or UN
weapons inspections which simply had not been given time to
do their job.
That left British officials "scrabbling for the smoking gun",
namely the much talked about evidence of Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction as a pretext for the war as preparations
continued and the case for invasion was made in Westminster.
He went on to say that "we - the Americans and the British -
have never really recovered from that, because, of course,
there was no smoking gun"; and to imply that Mr Blair failed
to leverage advances on the Palestinian/Israeli problem or
demand better post-invasion planning for Iraq in return for
the eventual support of Mr Bush.
With blanket coverage in the United Kingdom press, the
Chilcot show looks set to run and run.
Exactly where it will lead to and what will result, however,
remains unclear.
As Sir John himself has said, his inquiry is not a court and
neither does it exist to apportion blame.
And, as others have pointed out, while certain individuals,
such as Mr Blair, may certainly feel the heat, the British
Parliament itself sanctioned the war and, whatever the
inquiry reveals, bears a high degree of culpability itself.
Others still have declared it an outrage that the Chilcot
report will not be ready and released until after the next
British general election, which means in the unlikely event
of it leading to a pandemic of finger-pointing it will have
little impact on the make-up of the new body of elected
politicians, many of whom will have voted for participation
in what is increasingly regarded as a capitulation to US
power and a tragic and needless war.
