When voters go to the polls on November 26, they will have been assailed by information and doubtless vigorous campaigning on the pros and cons of New Zealand's voting system. In particular, the views of the electorate will be sought on whether or not to retain MMP.
What may get lost in the prevailing argument and counter argument is that there is in train a wide-ranging constitutional review - and the results of this are inextricably linked to the big picture, and efficacy, of this country's future government.
As part of its coalition agreement with the Maori Party following the 2008 election, the National Party agreed to institute a cross-party review of "constitutional arrangements". Its introduction was delayed a year and launched on December 8, 2010.
The working group has until the end of 2013 to present its recommendations to Parliament. Common understanding has it the review is primarily related to the Crown-Maori relationship, including the question of Maori representation and the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in constitutional affairs.
This is, in fact, a misleading interpretation. For in addition to such other concerns as whether New Zealand should have a written constitution, and issues relating to the Bill of Rights, the terms of reference for the review contain a number of electoral matters including the size of Parliament, the length of the Parliamentary term, the size and number of electorates and electoral integrity legislation.
Among these, arguably the most critical - particularly as it relates to any potential change in voting system - is the length of the Parliamentary term. This now stands at three years, a term that has regularly been criticised by politicians, political scientists and other commentators.
A primary objection to the three-year term is it imposes a rhythm on the business of government inimical to good policy and law-making. Incoming governments typically rush to implement electoral pledges whether they stand the test of wider Parliamentary scrutiny or not.
The second year in office is one of consolidation and further policy "enhancements", and the third is in good part directed towards the forthcoming election. The pressure to put political points on the board has in recent years led to an excessive use of urgency to drive through legislation.
The observation has been made that such a system impoverishes political culture. Long-term planning of well-designed policy becomes impossible; leading constitutional lawyer Sir Geoffrey Palmer has referred to the three-year cycle as "the greatest enemy of good legislation".
In the past the public has begged to differ. Ballots in 1967 and 1990 firmly rejected the notion of adopting a longer term, but as was argued by Chapman Tripp lawyer and partner Andy Nicholls in a recent opinion article on Stuff: "Voters are naturally wary of yielding more power to the politicians. But there is a point at which voter sovereignty has to be balanced against intelligent and effective government - and international evidence would suggest that the three-year term may be on the wrong side of that balance".
Certainly, the three-year cycle places New Zealand at odds with almost every other OECD country. Of its 34 nations, 22 have a four-year term, seven a five-year term, New Zealand, Australia and Mexico three years and the United States Congress two years.
The stark difference between New Zealand and Australia, Mexico and the US, however, is the latter three all have bi-cameral systems in which their upper houses have six-year terms. New Zealand, as is well-known, has a uni-cameral system.
In 1986, a royal commission concluded a four-year-term would be preferable in this country and lead to more effective government if more constraints were placed on the power of the executive - such as those routinely provided by an upper house in other countries. In fact, whatever else its faults or benefits, this is precisely what MMP also provides.
Should sufficient voters opt for a change through the ballot at this election, the exact form of replacement will be put before them in 2014. That year they could conceivably also find themselves voting on the length of the Parliamentary term.
The quality of New Zealand democracy sits interdependently in both, and that must be taken into account by those charged with overseeing our constitutional affairs.
