A Hasidic Jew waves an Israeli flag as he dances with
Israeli troops yesterday during a visit to support the
soldiers near the border with the Gaza Strip. Photo by
Reuters.
Let's be fair: there does seem to be some sort of pattern
here, but it is not very consistent.
Five times in Israel since 1980 a right-wing government has
called an election WITHOUT launching a complementary military
operation. The Right lost two of those elections outright
(1992, 1999), more or less tied two others (1984, 1988) and
won only one decisively (2006).
On the other hand, critics of Israel point out, three times
since 1980 right-wing Israeli governments have combined an
election campaign with a major military operation against
some Arab or Palestinian target. And this combination, it has
been argued, yields decisive electoral success for the Right.
Menachem Begin's government won the 1981 election three weeks
after carrying out a dramatic attack on the Osirak research
nuclear reactor that France had sold to Iraq. In the view of
most outside observers, the reactor, which was closely
supervised both by the French and by the International Atomic
Energy Agency, was not suited to the large-scale production
of enriched uranium and posed no threat to Israel, but the
attack was popular in Israel.
Ehud Olmert's coalition launched the "Cast Lead" onslaught
against the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009. The
three-week campaign of massive bombardments and some ground
incursions left 1400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis dead. The
election was held a month later, and Binyamin Netanyahu
emerged as the leader of a new right-wing coalition.
So here we go again, perhaps?
Mr Netanyahu is still the prime minister, and the next
elections are due in January. What better way to ensure
success than to go and bash the Palestinians again?
A week later, with 86 Palestinians and three Israelis dead,
his re-election is assured: Israelis overwhelmingly support
the current military operation.
That's the case that is made against Israel. Does it hold
water?
Well, actually, no, it doesn't.
Mr Begin's attack on the Osirak reactor in 1981 may well have
been an electoral stunt, although he was clearly paranoid
about the possibility of a nuclear weapon in Arab hands.
But Ehud Olmert, though undoubtedly a man of the Right, was
not leading a right-wing government in 2008. He was the
leader of a new centrist party, Kadima, that had been formed
by defectors from both the right-wing Likud Party and
left-wing Labour.
Moreover, Mr Olmert had already resigned in mid-2008 over a
corruption scandal, and was merely acting as interim prime
minister by the time the "Cast Lead" operation was launched
in December of that year. If it was an electoral ploy despite
all that, it didn't work. It was the Right that actually won
the election in early 2009, and formed a government led by
the Likud Party's Mr Netanyahu.
It is equally hard to believe that Mr Netanyahu is seeking
electoral gain by attacking Gaza this month. Every opinion
poll in Israel for months past has been saying that he is
going to win the January election hands down. For him, all
the risk of "Operation Pillar of Defence" is on the down
side: a major loss of Israeli lives in the campaign, while
unlikely, could only work against him.
So why is this happening now?
Historians traditionally split into two camps: those who see
purpose and planning and plots behind every event, and those
who think most events are just the random interaction of
conflicting strategies, imperfect information and human
frailty. This latter approach is known in the historical
trade as the "cock-up theory of history", and it is very
attractive as an explanation for the current situation.
Mr Netanyahu, cruising home to an easy electoral victory in
January, had absolutely no need for a little war with the
Palestinians. Indeed, his strategy of continuously shouting
"wolf" about Iran and its alleged nuclear weapons programme
has succeeded in distracting international attention from the
Palestinians, leaving him free to expand Jewish settlement in
the occupied West Bank unhindered.
Similarly, the Hamas leaders who ruled Gaza had no interest
in triggering a military conflict with Israel. They had every
reason to believe that the sweeping political changes in the
Arab world were strengthening their position internationally,
and they had no need to remind Arabs of their plight. So how
did this idiocy happen?
Another cock-up, of course.
Hamas has been trying to maintain calm in Gaza and extend a
ceasefire agreement with Israel, but it has little control
over various radical jihadi groups who build popular support
by making utterly futile rocket attacks on Israel. Even if
they kill a few Israelis, so what?
How does that serve the cause?
Hamas faces the permanent political danger of being
outflanked by more extremist rivals, so it cannot crack down
too hard on the jihadis.
Israel, fed up with their pinprick attacks, was looking for
somebody to punish and since it couldn't locate all the
jihadi leaders, it decided to assassinate Ahmed al-Jaabari,
the head of the military wing of Hamas.
Even though that was bound to end the ceasefire.
So then Hamas fired a few of its own rockets into Israel, and
Israel retaliated massively, and we were off to the races
once again. A complete cock-up, and a pointless waste of
lives.
But since the mini-war doesn't really serve the purposes of
any major player, it will probably be shut down again fairly
soon.
• Gwynne Dyer is an independent London
journalist.
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