Andrew Geddis considers the range of competing principles and issues raised by the case of blogger Cameron Slater, recently before the courts for breaching suppression orders.
It strikes me that many of those who push the boundaries and advocate strongest for the freedoms we all enjoy are not the sort of folks we'd like to pop by our house for a beer and a barbecue.
Cameron Slater's decision to breach name suppression orders on his blog and fight the subsequent charges in court provides a case in point.
I've never met this fellow, who seems determined to brand his entire personality by the name of his website, "Whaleoil".
And given how Mr Slater chooses to present himself to the world, I really don't think I'd gain any pleasure from such a meeting.
Nevertheless, his current quest for martyrdom raises complex, important and quite urgent questions.
A few qualifications to that last sentence, before I return to it.
First of all, I'm highly suspicious of Mr Slater's claim that his deliberate flouting of court orders was motivated by a deep commitment to the principles of open justice and free speech.
His subsequent crowing about how many extra page hits (and attention from the "real" media) the issue has generated for him makes me think he's more interested in doing well than doing much good.
However, the motive for his actions doesn't necessarily undermine the importance of the issue he illustrates.
Second, the particular examples Mr Slater has chosen to fight his battle on are not that compelling on closer inspection.
Sure, the now infamous "prominent NZ entertainer" who obtained permanent name suppression after conviction for a late-night, drunken sexual assault represents a quite debatable judicial decision.
But the temporary (note that - temporary) suppression of the name of a "former Olympian" until his trial on multiple charges of sexual violence against his wife was imposed purely to protect the identity of his victim.
Parliament has instructed that a suppression order in such cases is all but mandatory, precisely because publishing the identity of the alleged attacker would inevitably tell the world what his wife has suffered.
Actually, I'm a little surprised this aspect of the case has been so ignored.
Perhaps the "real" media might like to question Mr Slater a little more closely as to just why he took it on himself to make public a rape survivor's identity? Which leads to a third point.
Mr Slater's preferred solution to the problem of when it is legitimate to prevent the publication of an accused's name is to restrict such orders to "[cases] involving sex crimes against minors, so that the victims are not identified".
Oh well, so much in that case for the poor wife of the ex-Olympian.
Apparently, "open justice" (and Mr Slater's attendant right to blog as he desires) means we all get to revel in the knowledge she allegedly is a rape survivor.
Such are the costs of true principle fearlessly applied.
As you may guess, I don't have much time for Mr Slater and his self-pronounced jihad.
I strongly suspect he'll end up with a conviction, despite his cute attempts to sidestep the law by using pictures rather than words to identify the individuals concerned.
However, what is complex, important and quite urgent is the balancing of a range of competing principles required in any situation where name suppression is considered.
Yes, freedom of expression is one such principle.
That freedom helps to advance the important institutional value of open justice seen to be fair and impartially applied.
But it also comes up against interests in privacy for both the accused, who may not be guilty of anything at all, and the victim of crime, as well as concerns about the ability of providing fair and impartial trials by jury in an atmosphere of media frenzy.
These are tough issues, and anyone who thinks there is an easy answer to them is (by definition) simple minded.
Fortunately, such problems don't have to be resolved by people like Mr Slater simply doing what they want in cyberspace.
Some serious and sensible people have been thinking about it too.
In fact, in a rather nice coincidence of timing, the Law Commission reported its recommendations on reforming the law on name suppression to Parliament just two days before Mr Slater had his date with destiny.
From the summary of that report, the commission recommends that: The courts should have the power to make an order prohibiting publication of the name, address, or occupation of a person accused or convicted of an offence, or any particulars likely to lead to that person's identification, on any of these grounds:
(a) where there is a real risk of prejudice to a fair trial;
(b) to prevent undue hardship to victims;
(c) to prevent extreme hardship to the accused and/or persons connected with the accused;
(d) where publication would endanger the safety of any person;
(e) where publication would identify another person whose name is suppressed by order or by law;
(f) where publication is likely to prejudice the interests of the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation and detection of offences;
(g) where publication would cast suspicion on other people that may result in undue hardship.
That's the Law Commission's view, anyway.
Now it is in the hands of Parliament (or, really, the Government) to decide what to do next.
Which is far, far more preferable to leaving it to the "blogosphere" to sort out.
• Andrew Geddis is associate professor of law at the University of Otago.
