There are two distinct conflicts around Gaza, and Israel is winning neither at present.
In New Zealand the focus has been on "recognition" of Palestine as a state, and on the sanctions question raised by the Greens.
It is worth standing back and testing what we know and what we hope for.
Israel thinks that if you win every battle, you win the war. Hamas believes that losing every battle (romantically, as martyrs) will win them the war. They can’t both be right.
The Palestinians in Gaza are the meat in this ugly grinder. The result may be — for many — a surprise defeat for Israel both in Gaza and in the equally brutal but less bloody war for public opinion. There are two questions on everyone’s mind: can there be a ceasefire, and can there be a settlement? A ceasefire is to allow aid to reach Gaza’s civilians. A settlement is commonly thought to bring about a "two state" solution.
We think both sides are aware that neither of these makes any sense.
There are two wars here. There is the physical war in Gaza, pitting Israeli armour and surveillance tech against urban guerrillas with a determined, violent and tightly run organisation. Both sides are willing to sacrifice civilians.
The other is the information war, for global public opinion. Hamas is winning. The October 7, 2023 atrocities are all but forgotten in the outrage over Israeli blockade and bombardment.
Let’s look at the the two sides.
Hamas is an extreme Islamist organisation, close to the (banned) Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It’s committed to an Islamic state, and the destruction of Israel. It’s tightly run, with good security. A hundred years ago we’d label it "Leninist" in its methods, and disregard for its own civilian population.
Hamas hides among the people, and despite Israel’s successes is still able to offer meaningful military resistance. The Israelis have more technology at their disposal but have still not mastered the tunnels Hamas has built under Gaza.
Hence, in part, Israel’s inability to recover all the hostages, alive or dead (along with some great Hamas security). Remember, Gaza is just a bit bigger than the Taieri Plain. In the North Island it fits comfortably into the Masterton to Featherston plain.
Hamas recruits from the civilian population. The small scale of Gaza means that Hamas fighters can live underground but still be close to their families, and yet they are recognisably guerrilla fighters.
The IDF in contrast is a conscript people’s army. Mobilisation has a human as well as an economic cost, which is why IDF commanders are so against static occupation warfare.
Israel can dominate much of the land war, and in the air, cyber, space and off the coast, but Hamas still has funds and has aced the information war.
Israel is losing the battle for public opinion, disastrously. They are not fighting only Hamas there, but all their enemies, including the enemies of Jewry as well as of Israel.
Indeed, military victory in Gaza may be one of the most important factors behind defeat in "Gaza", the imaginary land where public opinion roams. Israel has resorted to ineffective, fact-based information campaigns. These rarely work once opinion has turned against them.
Truth is only one among many factors in information campaigning, and often not the most important. This is not beyond remedy, but the direction of travel is ominous.
How do the two sides win?
We start with Israel. In the longer term, learn the lessons. Vietnam (a very similar story) produced the Powell Doctrine: only fight with clear objectives, use overwhelming force to achieve them and stop.
Israel’s 1982 campaign in Lebanon produced a lot of the same thinking in the IDF. Israel’s successful recent campaigns against Hezbullah and Iran have shown they know how to win.
But Gaza seems different because of the hostages and the staying power of Hamas. It isn’t different; the Israelis have just forgotten the lessons they have applied elsewhere.
The achievable objective should have been to eliminate anyone who had any role in the October 7 attacks; isolate Hamas from support in the region and beyond; and build a post-Hamas consensus in Gaza. Israel’s declared objective of the total destruction of Gaza is a strategic blunder because it can’t be done.
So how does Hamas win? Let’s remember Hamas’ war aims on October 7. First, stop the Abraham Accords (that made peace between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain) extending to Saudi recognition of Israel. Second, bring back enough hostages to trade for Hamas prisoners in Israeli custody.
Third, and building on the first two, maintain and enhance the core Hamas role as the centrepiece of armed resistance to Israel, the movement’s main appeal to the Palestinian population.
At the very least, so far so good. Yes, the movement has been decapitated, but other leaders have emerged. Some Palestinians seem to blame Hamas for the destruction which Israel has visited on Gaza, but numbers are soft, unsurprisingly given the brutality with which Hamas manages dissent.
What does success for Hamas look like now?
First, by surviving as thousands of Palestinians die. Thanks to Hamas’ exceptional information management, it doesn’t matter much how they die — Israel will be blamed. The erosion of support for Israel in the Muslim-dominated electorates of Europe and in the US is a massive strategic victory.
Don’t underestimate this: the UK’s Labour government holds 25 House of Commons seats thanks to the Muslim vote. In France, Muslim voters will be a major voice in the next presidential election. Arguably, recognising a Palestinian state is entirely about placating this voice.
Second, Hamas survives by reconstituting its ranks from Gaza’s only real asset, its surfeit of people. There may be 700,000 men of military age in Gaza, and virtually no economy to employ them. Hamas doesn’t have to offer much, especially when "martyrdom" might be the most lucrative career choice available.
A prisoner swap for the hostages would be a bonus. The new recruits don’t have to be of high quality when dying a martyr’s death is an actual strategy.
The third component of success is the hardest to achieve. Hamas has historically done very well out of the asymmetric value of hostages — over 1000 prisoners were released in return for one Israeli, Gilad Shalit.
But this war has challenged the assumption that Israel will do anything to get its people back. Netanyahu seems to have changed that to a commitment to punish anyone associated with the kidnap of Israelis.
Brutal as it may be, his refusal to prioritise negotiation for the release of the 20 living hostages over military objectives sends a clear message to future generations of would-be kidnappers.
What will happen next?
Israel needs a way out. A ceasefire seems like it’s made to be broken, by both sides. Our judgement is that Hamas won’t want a ceasefire that lasts long enough to be effective and let world opinion (notoriously fickle) move on.
Israel won’t want one at all because nothing will convince Hamas to surrender, and taking the pressure off will let Hamas regroup and rearm. So, the war continues until something else happens. Temporary halts in fighting may come and go; the basic logic for war remains.
What about a settlement?
The two-state solution exists mainly in the minds of foreigners. It’s a means of evading, not facing inconvenient truths.
Just look at the intellectual gymnastics of our own government (and the Australians and others). The Palestinian state was meant to include the West Bank and Gaza. Our government and others say that recognition has to exclude Hamas, and only include the Palestinian Authority. Confined to shrinking parts of the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is corrupt, gerontocratic, undemocratic, authoritarian and ineffective.
It won’t change. Recent announcements of more settlements mean the physical case for statehood is eroded daily. The intermingling of settlements (Israeli and Palestinian) means any clear territorial definition is impossible anyway. And Gaza? Well, Hamas is the Palestinian government in Gaza. There is no other. That’s what you’re proposing to recognise.
What might happen?
There are two realistic outcomes, and New Zealand can do nothing about either. Either Israel gives up its war aims and agrees to let Hamas survive. Or the madcap Donald Trump idea of moving the Palestinians out gets traction. Madcap, yes. Impossible? No.
The first is more likely. The relevant analogy is Vietnam. We’re old enough to remember, but for those of you fortunate enough to be younger, let’s explain briefly.
Sixty years ago, the Vietcong (based in North Vietnam) were fighting an insurgent, guerrilla war against South Vietnam and the US. They fought a hit-and-run campaign, mostly.
When they did come out and fight (like the 1968 Tet Offensive), the US was able to beat them. So, they stayed hidden in the jungle and among the people and dragged out the fighting.
The US lost the war for public opinion (especially at home in the US), and then lost the will to fight, and left. The Vietcong won.
The parallels with Gaza are real (right down to the use of tunnels). Israel is being painted as the genocidal warmonger. Its economy and society are paying a heavy price. The IDF has opposed further occupation as it will cost pointless blood and treasure and play into the Hamas narrative.
Israel’s politics (already fractured) mean the government teeters daily on the brink of collapse and the inevitable recrimination.
And if US public opinion shifts against Israel (unlikely soon, but very likely over time), then Israel will certainly have to stop. Stopping will tacitly agree to Hamas’ survival. Hamas wins this round.
The other less likely alternative is mass depopulation of Gaza, by bribery or by force, or both. This would separate Hamas and many Palestinians from their proximity to Israel, and from the carefully nurtured belief that one day they will all return to their pre-1948 homes.
The result might even be a Palestinian state. There are reports of land being considered in Jordan and Somaliland.
Neither place is very appealing. But maybe better than what they have now.
The first outcome is more likely; don’t discount the second.
— Ian Fletcher is a former director of the GCSB, and has worked in the UK, Europe and the Middle East; Ian Baharie is an Arabic-speaking former British diplomat who has served in Jerusalem and Gaza.
