1918 YEAR OF VICTORY
Ed. Ashley Ekins
Exisle, $54.99, hbk
Reviewed by Oliver Riddell.
In all that time, there has been very little agreement over how the war began, how it was fought, how it was ended, or who won or lost it.
That may be changing.
In November 2008, to mark the 90th anniversary of the signing of the Armistice, a conference was held in Canberra, Australia.
Sixteen experts on the war were invited to present papers on specialist aspects of its final year; these form 1918: Year Of Victory.
It is perhaps not surprising that Australian experts are strongly represented - nine of the 16.
But Australian concerns are not per se over-represented, except in the paper looking at the fate of veterans after the war, which compares universal experiences with those specific to Australia.
Many of the papers are from a national perspective, including one by New Zealand military historian Glyn Harper on the characteristics of the New Zealand Division in France and its performance at the Battle of Bapaume.
Without exception, they are readable, informative and enjoyable.
But most notably, considering the bitter arguments of the past 100 years between military historians and commentators, there is considerable agreement.
No longer are the British bagging the French or vice-versa; no longer are the Italians and Austrians universally despised; no longer are the Germans refusing to admit defeat or claiming to have "been stabbed in the back"; no longer are the Americans turning their back on the rest of the world or refusing to honour their commitments.
It took World War 2 to change all that.
World War 1 was meant to be "the war to end all wars", and was anything but.
It began because Germany thought that it and its few friends could take on the rest of the world.
Because it lost the war, and was too proud to admit it, Germany chose to fight another war against most of the rest of the world.
Losing that beyond any puling excuse that its pride could dredge up has been decisive.
None of the powers that won World War 2 has fought a hot war against each other since.
There have been cold wars and minor wars, but no hot war.
These papers make it clear why only Germany, of the losing powers of World War 1, wanted to fight another one.
Italy and Japan were both on the winning side the first time around.
This book has many great vignettes.
There is an excellent review of the 1918 naval war, and an even better one of the 1918 air war, which includes a long-overdue demolition of the role of the aces - those magnificent men in their flying machines.
Due justice is done to the colonial armies from Canada and Australia.
But the over-the-top press they have had for a century is diminished appropriately too, while the long misprised French and British armies are given their due.
But the best papers are the first and last.
The first is a sensible review of why the Entente armies won.
It has taken 100 years of vitriolic deprecation, defensiveness and bitterness, but finally a consensus has emerged.
The Entente won because it had more men, more and better munitions, seized new inventions (notably the tank) better, strangled its enemies' commerce, and (a previously unfashionable point) possessed a greater ethnic diversity.
The last paper is a fascinating account of how views on the military history of World War 1 have changed.
There is so much for the serious student of military affairs to relish in the book, and so much for the interested general reader too.
• Oliver Riddell is a Wellington writer.
