In recent weeks I have argued that New Zealand must think more carefully about its place in a changing world. That question is no longer abstract. It is beginning to take practical form.
Two countries, in particular, illustrate the choices now emerging for middle powers.
Australia is moving towards deeper operational integration with the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The closer forces are integrated, the harder it becomes to remain politically separate when it matters. Recent developments in northern Australia, including expanded base facilities, rotational US forces, and the Aukus programme centred on nuclear-powered submarines, point clearly in that direction.
Canada, by contrast, appears to be widening its options — diversifying its economic and strategic relationships while remaining aligned with long-standing partners. Under Mark Carney, there are signs of deliberate effort to reduce exposure to a single dominant partner, while strengthening ties within Nato and with Europe more broadly.
Neither approach is inherently right or wrong. Each reflects geography, history and national temperament.
Australia faces directly into the Indo-Pacific and has elected to anchor itself firmly within an American-led system. Canada, with different pressures and opportunities, is seeking to widen its room for manoeuvre.
The question is what this means for New Zealand.
For many years, New Zealand has worked comfortably alongside Australia, building interoperability, shared doctrine and a high degree of operational familiarity. That habit of co-operation is both natural and valuable.
But habits can also obscure change. If Australia is moving towards deeper integration within a US operational framework, then the nature of that partnership is also changing.
Interoperability is one thing. Strategic alignment by default is another.
New Zealand has not made the same choices as Australia. Nor is it compelled to do so. It retains, for now, a greater degree of separation — political, operational and geographic.
The question is whether that separation is something to be preserved and managed, or gradually surrendered through language, expectation and routine co-operation.
While interoperability is often treated as a technical matter, it doesn’t require uniformity of action; partners can work together without always acting the same way.
Recent developments elsewhere offer a useful point of comparison. Canada’s efforts to diversify its economic and strategic relationships do not eliminate dependence on the US. That would be neither realistic nor desirable.
But they do alter its character. By preparing alternatives in advance, Canada increases its room for manoeuvre and reduces the likelihood that pressure from any one direction will prove decisive.
There is a lesson in that.
New Zealand does not have Canada’s scale, nor its proximity to alternative markets. Nor does it face Australia’s immediate strategic environment.
But it does have a choice about how it positions itself within a changing system.
Australia is choosing proximity to power. Canada is choosing freedom of manoeuvre. Both are legitimate responses to a more uncertain world, but they are not the same.
New Zealand’s interests will not be served by drifting unexamined into either position. The issue is not whether we align with long-standing partners. It is how closely and on what terms.
We may not be able to choose our geography, but we can still choose our degree of dependence.
• Graye Shattky is a former soldier living in Central Otago.
