The one thing to be said with confidence about the "leaky homes" saga is the bucket of financial recompense beneath it is not bottomless. Arguments about the extent and apportioning of blame will continue, but there had at some point to be reckoning.
So while there may be much gnashing of teeth and consternation on the part of affected homeowners at the final relief package, there will equally also be many pleased that, finally, this debilitating problem has been addressed.
It will enable those homeowners to make decisions based on a sound understanding of the assistance available to them, rather than - as has hitherto been the case - leaving them floundering in a demoralising and depressing legislative vacuum.
To recap, the "leaky homes" crisis arose in the 1990s following deregulation of the building industry. Problems with design, products, cladding, workmanship and the checks and balances of inspection processes left many homeowners exposed to faulty buildings.
In particular, the Building Act 1991, which came into force under Jim Bolger's National Government, allowed the use of untreated timber framing and monolithic cladding systems. Coupled with a rise in Mediterranean-style designs with flat or low pitched roofs and reduced or non-existent eaves, and the gradual loss of the traditional builders' apprenticeships, this led to the construction of many thousands of homes with severe weather-tightness issues.
When, several years later, the various flaws in the construction and materials became apparent, the first line of responsibility - the builder - had often moved on or gone out of business. That left owners targeting the councils which had sanctioned and approved the buildings during their construction. For their part, the councils put the spotlight on lax government regulation, arguing this was where the responsibility should be sheeted home.
While predominantly a problem in Auckland and other northern cities where the property boom of the mid-1990s onwards took greatest effect, the contagion of leaky homes has been seen across the country. A PricewaterhouseCoopers report from 2010 put the cost of the crisis at about $11.5 billion.
Figures for the number of homes affected ranged, depending on source, from 40,000 to about double that figure.
The scheme announced on Thursday shares the burden of cost across the three main parties involved. The owners will meet 50% of the agreed repair costs of any particular project, backed by a government loan guarantee, and the Government and the local authorities will each contribute 25% of the remaining costs.
While this may appear arbitrary - and many homeowners will argue it is loaded against them to the extent repairs will still be unaffordable - there is probably no formula that would ever satisfy all parties.
Government and local bodies will have been all too aware, for instance, their own share of righting the crisis amounts, albeit indirectly, to an impost on the taxpayer and the ratepayer; and those people are entitled to ask why they should be helping to pay for the mistakes of others: did they not obtain the appropriate house checks and surveys before purchasing their properties? If not, why not? And whatever happened to the principle of caveat emptor - "buyer beware"?
Housing Minister Maurice Williamson says the deal is likely to cost the Crown a little more than $1 billion during the next five years - on the basis 70% of known cases pick up on the deal. By that reckoning it should cost local authorities a similar amount.
That is a very large sum and it must come from somewhere - either from raised "taxes" or cuts in services. Thus, there will be pain in the solution. But there must be lessons, too. Part of the function of government, national or local, is to oversee rules and regulations - and there will always be tension between the degree of regulation and the costs of compliance, particularly with respect to industry.
The rot of this crisis set in when a liberalising government failed to get the balance right. It was exacerbated by inadequate construction practice and the lax compliance checking procedures of councils. Unfortunately, there are now signs in the exhaustive checks required and the rocketing consent costs in Otago that the pendulum may have swung too far the other way.
