Lessons from Chilcot clear

Sir John Chilcot presents the Iraq Inquiry Report in Westminster last month. Photos from Reuters.
Sir John Chilcot presents the Iraq Inquiry Report in Westminster last month. Photos from Reuters.
Former British prime minister Tony Blair delivers a speech following publication of the report.
Former British prime minister Tony Blair delivers a speech following publication of the report.

The Chilcot report has lessons for political leaders everywhere, Robert G. Patman writes.

Sir John Chilcot's massive 6275-page report on Britain's involvement in the invasion and occupation of Iraq highlights some enduring political lessons for decision-makers in the UK and elsewhere.

Among other things, the Chilcot report - known sometimes as the Iraq Inquiry - pinpoints the connection between a flawed decision-making process in the UK and Britain's ultimate willingness to commit to back the disastrous US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Decision-making consists of the act of choosing among available alternatives about which a certain amount of uncertainty exists.

The Chilcot report is important because it illuminates a number of factors in the decision-making process of Tony Blair's Labour government that were either previously disputed or shrouded in mystery.

It is now clear the Blair government did not, as it often claimed, simply act on the information and intelligence that was available at the time.

According to Chilcot, the realities of British decision-making were rather different.

First, there was no real evidence of an imminent threat to the UK, US or other countries from Iraq in March 2003. It would have been dangerous, even suicidal, for the Saddam regime to attempt such threats.

Second, there was little evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime had weapons of mass destruction. British intelligence "had not established beyond doubt'' that Saddam Hussein was continuing to produce chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.

Third, Mr Blair committed himself to regime change in Iraq even before 9/11. He advocated removing Saddam in a phone call to Mr Bush on September 3, 2001, and then reaffirmed that position in 2002. Mr Blair showed only a limited capacity for self-doubt and never seriously questioned the correctness of his government's policies.

Fourth, Mr Blair was given advance warnings that an invasion of Iraq would fuel terrorism. In early 2003, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) warned an Iraq invasion would "heighten'' the threat from al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.

Fifth, and not unrelated, Mr Blair selectively used evidence to "make the case'' for an Iraq invasion. There were no shortage of warnings from the intelligence community about the dangers of invading Iraq, but the British prime minister tended to "cherry-pick'' intelligence that reinforced his own convictions about the Saddam "threat''.

The real-world consequences of this flawed decision-making process were huge, and are still unfolding. The US and UK bypassed the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - when the council refused to authorise the use of force in Iraq - and launched an illegal invasion of the country. That invasion enabled al Qaeda to get a foothold in the country, facilitated the gradual emergence of IS, and inflated the role of Iran in the Middle East.

Far from increasing stability and peace in the Middle East, the Iraq invasion destabilised the region and played a significant part in the subsequent internationalisation of the threat of Islamic terrorism.

At the same time, the economic and human costs of the Iraq invasion were horrendous. The direct cost of the Iraq conflict to the UK was the equivalent of 11.83billion ($NZ18.4billion) today. More than 174,000 Iraqi civilians have died as direct casualties from the start of the war in 2003 to about March 2016. The UK lost 179 servicemen and women, of whom 136 were killed in action.

By identifying the limitations and consequences of the Blair government's decision-making in relation to Iraq, the Chilcot report helps to illuminate some significant lessons for political leaders when grappling with foreign policy decisions:

Be sceptical: do not trust the optimistic projections of allies or particular elements within the intelligence community or government.

Tolerate dissent: among advisers and encourage them to offer independent analysis and champion an independent media.

Be courageous: challenge the views of more powerful allies and if necessary withhold support from military actions they propose.

Listen carefully: to the views of other actors in forums like the UN and its top decision-making body, the UNSC.

Retain the capacity to put yourself in the shoes of potential adversaries when formulating policy.

Be prepared to take domestic criticism over foreign policy.

Always distinguish between short-term and long-term interests in framing foreign policy, and make sure the conduct of foreign policy is consistent with the norms and values upheld by society.

Military force should be used as an absolute last resort and only if peaceful solutions have been exhausted, there is clear and compelling evidence of an imminent threat, and there is strong international support.

Many of these lessons seemed to have been learnt by former New Zealand prime minister, Helen Clark, who refused to back the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

That decision was subject to some domestic and international criticism, but proved to be a wise one over time, particularly when one considers the findings of the recent Chilcot report.

-Robert G. Patman is a professor of international relations at the University of Otago.

Add a Comment