Diabolical Monte Cassino military decisions dissected

THE BATTLES OF MONTE CASSINO<br>The campaign and its controversies<br><b>Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell</b><br><i>Allen & Unwin</i>
THE BATTLES OF MONTE CASSINO<br>The campaign and its controversies<br><b>Glyn Harper and John Tonkin-Covell</b><br><i>Allen & Unwin</i>
No matter how brave or well-equipped soldiers are, their lives will be unduly sacrificed and battles lost if planning and decision-making are faulty.

New Zealand authors Harper and Tonkin-Covell have put the famous World War 2 battles under a critical microscope.

The war was entering its final phase when the Allies, commanded by Lord Harold Alexander, began the conquest of Italy reaching a position south of Rome in early 1944. There they were held up by a strong German defensive position, the Gustav Line, centred around the small town of Cassino, overlooked by a monastery.

Among the fighting men attempting to pierce the German defences were New Zealand forces commanded by Lieutenant-general Bernard Freyberg (later New Zealand's Governor-General).

Military-type readers will know these infamous battles have been verbally fought and refought in numerous publications, to which the authors frequently make reference. This helps reinforce the conclusions they reach, broadens their perspectives, but does make reading the text a little difficult.

As well as Freyberg, the generals under the spotlight are Allies Chief of Staff Lord Harold Alexander and United States Lieutenant-general Mark Clark. But as well there's a dozen or more less well-known generals who contribute to the overall picture, which is: the battles for Monte Cassino were a disaster for

Allied forces, with unnecessary loss of life due to poor decision-making.

Lasting impressions are: the description of New Zealand troops deployed by Freyberg using the same formations to attack entrenched German positions that had proved a failure on three previous occasions; Allied forces coming under ''friendly fire'' by American aircraft; and Allied air forces obliterating the town of Cassino, but not the German machine-gun positions, which proved difficult to dislodge and resulted in unnecessary loss of life, as the rubble compromised allied tanks' manoeuvrability and usefulness.

Indeed, as the authors state, ''the air superiority of the Allies was never realised during the battles for Cassino, at some cost in terms of lives lost and unnecessary delays in reaching objectives''.

- Ian Williams is a Dunedin writer and composer.

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